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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Central Intelligence Agency

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SUBJECT: Study Parameters for Net Assessment of DRV/RVNAF Forces

Secretary Laird's requested comparative analysis and net assessment of the DRV armed forces and the RVNAF hopefully could cover the following parameters:

- . troop levels (quantity and quality)
- . equipment
- . training
- . leadership
- . morale.

In addition, the Secretary would like an assessment of the overall capability of each force to

- . defend its own territory, and
- . project its military power across national boundaries.

The Secretary would appreciate the net assessment to be based upon:

- . The status as of 1 January 1972, and separately,
- . The projected status as of 1 January 1973.

You may assume that the projected military assistance to the DRV will be at those levels of the recent past. The projected assistance to the RVNAF can likewise be assumed to be at levels which, in essence, are projected from the trends of the recent past. You may treat US air and naval support parametrically; but it would be reasonable to assume declining levels of direct US military support.

In addition to the net assessments outlined above, Secretary Laird is interested, as you know, in the quantitative and qualitative arms limitations imposed on the DRV by Moscow and Peking. In particular, he would appreciate your judgments on:

OSD DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

*Laird "Net Assessment"*  
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- . What accounts for the current levels of USSR/PRC military aid, which, by reports we have seen, are lower than levels provided in the late 1960s?
- . What operating limitations, if any, do the lower military aid levels put on the DRV?
- . What accounts for the qualitative arms limitations, if any, imposed by Moscow and/or Peking (e.g., why haven't the Soviets provided SA-3s etc.)?
- . What operating limitations have qualitative limitations put on the DRV forces?
- . What would be the impact on the military situation in SEA if Moscow and/or Peking were to increase substantially the quantitative, and/or qualitative military assistance levels? to decrease, say cut in half, the military assistance levels?

*Bob*  
Robert E. Pursley  
Major General, USAF  
Military Assistant

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